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THE CONSTITUTIONAL INEVITABILITY  
OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE* AND JOSHUA MATZ**
 
 
The cause of same-sex rights in the United States has enjoyed 
wondrous progress over the past decade.  Battles in the courts and 
legislatures, along with cultural shifts and struggles for people’s core 
beliefs, have produced such triumphs as Lawrence v. Texas,1 a growing 
number of state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation,2 the fall of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” through joint military, 
presidential, and congressional opposition,3 and full same-sex mar-
riage rights in Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Iowa, New 
Hampshire,4
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 Vermont, and the District of Columbia (with Washing-
* Laurence H. Tribe is Carl M. Loeb University Professor and Professor of Constitu-
tional Law, Harvard Law School.   
** Joshua Matz is a J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School, 2012.  A version of this essay 
first appeared as part of a symposium on same-sex marriage hosted by SCOTUSBLOG, at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-constitutional-inevitability-of-same-sex-marriage/ 
(Aug. 26, 2011). 
 1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 2. E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (Deering 2011) (prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation in employment); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2011) (same); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c-e (West 2011) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation in employment, public accommodations, and housing); 775 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102 (West 2011) (prohibiting discrimination against gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgender persons in the workplace); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 
(West 2011) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employ-
ment).  
 3. The Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, 107 Stat. 1670, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993), was re-
pealed by the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, § 2(f)(1)(A), 
124 Stat. 3516 (2010), which triggered a process that culminated on September 20, 2011, 
with the official end of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.  See also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT 
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, 
DON’T TELL” (2010); Kerry Eleveld, Gates and Mullen: Repeal DADT, THE ADVOCATE (Dec. 
2, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2010/12/02/ 
Gates_and_Mullen_Repeal_DADT/; Jason Links, David Petraeus on DADT: ‘The Time Has 
Come’, HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2010, 06:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/03/16/david-petraeus-on-dadt-th_n_500928.html.  
 4. However, as this article goes to press, Republicans in New Hampshire are pressing 
a major legislative effort to revoke same-sex marriage (although this would require a suc-
cessful override of Governor John Lynch’s promised veto).  See Abby Goodnough, As Gay 
Marriage Gains Ground in Nation, New Hampshire May Revoke Its Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 
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ton and Maryland likely soon to join the list).5  It is perhaps especially 
significant that the latest string of victories has been won through 
high-profile, hard-fought legislative battles—a fact that reveals the 
power of constitutionally grounded principles of liberty, equality, and 
dignity to resonate far beyond the courthouse door in a dynamic and 
interactive process of judicial, political, and popular constitutional in-
terpretation and social movement struggle.6
To be sure, in the early-to-mid 2000s the movement for marriage 
equality experienced dispiriting setbacks in a wave of state referenda.
   
7  
Nonetheless, recent polling indicates that a majority of Americans 
now support same-sex marriage rights,8
 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/us/gay-marriage-law-in-new-hampshire-may-
be-revoked.html. 
 numerous states have em-
 5. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); N.Y. DOM. REL. 
LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20(4) (West 2011); Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 15, § 8 (West 2011); D.C. CODE § 1283(a) (2011).  Legislatures in Maryland and Wash-
ington State passed bills legalizing same-sex marriage in 2012.  See Civil Marriage Protec-
tion Act, H.D. 438 & S. 241, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. March 1, 2012); Concerning civil 
marriage and domestic partnerships, H.R. 2516 & S. 6239, 62d Gen. Assemb., 2012 Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. Feb. 13, 2012).  The governors of both states promptly signed the legislation, 
but enactment of the laws could be delayed if opponents gather the necessary signatures to 
place repeal referenda on the ballot.  See Aaron C. Davis, Gay Marriage Bill Approved by Md. 
Senate, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2012, at A1; Reuters, Washington: Gay Marriage Legalized, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2012, at A17. 
 6. See, e.g., Ricardo Lopez, Gay Marriage Backers Find Success Emphasizing Love and Fami-
ly, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-gay-
marriage-20120304,0,1129155.story; Aaron C. Davis, Md. Becomes Eighth State to Legalize Gay 
Marriage, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/maryland-
politics/post/md-to-become-eighth-state-to-legalize-gay-marriage/2012/03/01/gIQAJKxm 
kR_blog.html; Michael Barbaro, Behind N.Y. Gay Marriage, an Unlikely Mix of Forces, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/nyregion/the-road-to-gay-
marriage-in-new-york.html?pagewanted=all.  A substantial body of work on popular consti-
tutionalism charts the course of interactions among political, popular, and judicial actors.  
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social 
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism As a Politi-
cal Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); Robert Post & 
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
373 (2007). 
 7. Thirty states have passed constitutional amendments defining marriage as between 
a man and a woman.  See Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 14, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/de-
fault.aspx?tabid=16430. 
 8. In May 2011, the Gallup polling organization reported that for the first time in its 
history of tracking the issue, a majority of Americans (53 percent) supported same-sex 
marriage.  Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage, 
GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147662/First-Time-Majority-
Americans-Favor-Legal-Gay-Marriage.aspx. 
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braced civil unions and are moving toward marriage,9 and the De-
partment of Justice has filed briefs in federal courts championing the 
rights of same-sex couples in cases challenging the so-called “Defense 
of Marriage Act” (“DOMA”).10  Those briefs of the United States urg-
ing federal courts to invalidate DOMA are, of course, remarkable in 
their departure from the normal although not invariable Executive 
Branch practice of defending the constitutionality of federal statutes 
even when the President, advised by the Justice Department, has con-
cluded that the disputed legislation is unconstitutional.11
It is ironic that this progress has become for some a justification 
for arguing that same-sex couples should wait a bit longer for their 
rights—that it would be better to wait another few years, or perhaps 
decades, so that majoritarian politics rather than judicial action might 
be the principal vehicle for bringing about the recognition of dignity 
that these men and women are currently being denied.
  These hear-
tening developments, born of both majoritarian politics and counter-
majoritarian judicial action, point the way to a brighter future for 
many gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals and couples (as well as 
their children, families, friends, and allies, all of whom share in the 
suffering that the perpetuation of unequal status inflicts throughout 
American society). 
12
 
 9. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 et seq. (a New Jersey law allowing civil unions that 
was adopted by the New Jersey Legislature in reaction to the opinion of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)); see also Andrew Gelman, Jeff-
rey Lax & Justin Phillips, Over Time, A Gay Marriage Groundswell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2010.  
The New Jersey legislature approved same-sex marriage legislation in February 2012, see 
Marriage Equality and Religious Exemption Act, S. 1, 215th Leg., 2012 Sess. (N.J. Feb. 16, 
2012), but the bill was vetoed by Gov. Chris Christie, who said he believed that voters 
should ultimately decide the issue in a ballot referendum.  See Kate Zernike, Christie Keeps 
His Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at A19.   
 
 10. See, e.g., Def.’s Br. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, Golinski v. United States Office of 
Pers. Mgmt., No. 3:10-cv-00257-JSW (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (stating that sexual orientation 
classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny and that the Defense of Marriage 
Act is unconstitutional because it cannot withstand that heightened level of review); see also 
News Release, Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of 
Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), 2011 WL 641582, at *1. 
 11. See generally Saikrishna Prakash & Neal Devins, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2012); Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 1073 (2001); Marty Lederman, John Roberts and the SG’s Refusal to Defend Federal Statutes 
in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, BALKANIZATION (Sept. 8, 2005), http://balkin.blog-
spot.com/2005/09/john-roberts-and-sgs-refusal-to-defend.html.  
 12. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Courts, the Political Process, and DOMA, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Aug. 25, 2011, 12:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-courts-the-political-
process-and-doma/ (“The ideal situation is to avoid a definitive constitutional ruling on 
the equal protection or due process right to same-sex marriage and to have the matter bat-
tled out in the legislative arena, as it was in New York this summer.”). 
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Many of those who advance this essentially gradualist view 
ground it in a rhetoric of hard-nosed realism and assure us that, even 
though they recognize the justice of the case for same-sex marriage 
(and the injustice of the practices denying marriage equality in most of 
the States), legislative change is preferable either as a matter of prin-
ciple in light of the need for democratic legitimacy13 or as a matter of 
prudence and strategy in light of the risk of socio-political backlash—
either against the gay rights movement or against the judiciary or 
both.14
Yet for all their realism, it is far from clear what consequence fol-
lows from this view.  Perhaps they would prefer that nobody bring a 
federal lawsuit seeking recognition of same-sex marriage rights.  But 
that ship has already sailed
 
15 and we see little point in revisiting a de-
cision that, though understandably controversial at the time,16
The first involves California’s notorious Proposition 8, which was 
recently invalidated by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.  Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for the panel 
majority, drew on Romer v. Evans
 is no 
longer especially salient.  Indeed, the constitutional status of same-sex 
marriage is before the federal judiciary on two separate fronts.   
17
 
 13. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Wedding Bell Blues, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 33. 
 to argue that withdrawing from 
gays and lesbians a marriage right that they had previously been 
 14. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Perry Decision and the Constitu-
tional Politics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 97 (2012), http:// 
www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/perry-marriage-equality (“California is ready for mar-
riage equality in ways most of the rest of the country is not: there are thousands of openly 
lesbian and gay couples, many rearing children, who have persuaded their neighbors and 
coworkers  that marriage equality would be good for their communities . . . .  It is likely 
that the federal courts of appeals in the South would be reluctant to reach exactly the 
same result as the Ninth Circuit in Perry. For now, the Supreme Court should deny review 
of those decisions as well. This would allow individual states to deliberate further, consis-
tent with the common law tradition and with the Court’s view of the states as ‘laboratories 
of experimentation.’ . . .  Marriage equality is an idea whose time has come for California, 
as well as for New York, whose legislature recognized marriage equality last year.  But has 
its time come everywhere in the country? I fear not.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding 
that Proposition 8, the California ballot measure that banned same-sex marriage, violated 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment), aff’d sub 
nom., Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696 & No. 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 
2012).  
 16. See Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, at 40 (noting that 
some leading gay rights organizations, including the ACLU, Human Rights Campaign, 
Lambda Legal, and the National Center for Lesbian Rights, initially issued a statement 
condemning David Boies and Ted Olson’s decision to challenge California’s Proposition 8 
in federal court). 
 17. 517 U.S 620 (1996). 
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granted, and doing so without legitimate reason (but solely on the ba-
sis of “animus”), violated the Equal Protection Clause.18  Judge Rein-
hardt thus declined to reach the broader question whether same-sex 
couples may ever be denied the right to marry in a state that makes 
civil marriage available to otherwise indistinguishable opposite-sex 
couples.19
 
 18. See Perry v. Brown, 2012 WL 372713, at *1–2, *17. 
  However, Proposition 8’s defenders have sought en banc re-
 19. Id. at *2.  Despite the understandable reasons for the panel’s decision to rest on 
the narrowest available ground, some have expressed concern that the court’s rationale 
could serve to deter state legislatures from conferring same-sex marriage rights, and state 
courts from locating such rights in state constitutional protections of equality, for fear that 
a federal court might later invalidate measures like Proposition 8, by which the people of a 
state assert their preference for having the issue resolved by popular referendum.  See, e.g., 
Editorial, Wobbly Justice, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2012, at A16 (“The California Supreme 
Court’s strained reading of the state constitution to mandate same-sex marriage gave rise 
to Proposition 8. The possible negative consequences of the 9th Circuit’s decision may be 
more far-reaching, discouraging states from adopting civil unions or domestic partnerships 
for fear that they may one day be forced to recognize same-sex marriages. We believe that 
same-sex couples should be allowed to marry, but it would be unfortunate if they were de-
prived of the significant protections afforded by these other designations.”); cf. David Cole, 
Gambling with Gay Marriage, NYRBLOG (Feb. 9, 2012, 11:48 AM), http://www.nybooks. 
com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/feb/09/gambling-gay-marriage/ (“[T]he court’s reasoning—
namely, that there is no conceivable motive, other than mere disapproval of a class of 
people, to deny same-sex couples the label ‘marriage’ when they are granted all other 
rights associated with marriage—would seem to apply to all states that allow same-sex 
couples to form civil unions, but not to marry. (New Jersey, Oregon, Nevada, Illinois, 
Rhode Island, Hawaii, Delaware, and Washington all fall into that category).”).   
The fact that no such deterrent effect appears to have prevented post-February 7, 
2012, developments moving in the direction of marriage equality in Maryland and Wash-
ington may cast doubt on that concern to the degree it expresses an empirical prediction, 
although of course those states were already contemplating a move to full same-sex mar-
riage rights and not a compromise “civil union” position whose constitutional footing may 
be less secure post-Perry.  Unsurprisingly, reactions to Judge Reinhardt’s opinion even 
among supporters of marriage equality have varied quite dramatically.  Compare Jason Maz-
zone, Marriage and the Ninth Circuit: Thumbs Down, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 7, 2012, 7:18 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/marriage-and-ninth-circuit-thumbs-down.html (“My 
initial reaction to the Ninth Circuit panel’s decision today in Perry v. Brown is that it is dis-
honest and foolish. It is dishonest because it warps the relevant background and misrepre-
sents Romer v. Evans to reach the conclusion that Romer requires invalidation of Proposi-
tion 8. It is foolish because it misses—indeed evades—a ripe opportunity for a straight-up 
ruling that a ban on same-sex marriage violates the federal Constitution, a ruling that has a 
better than even chance of being upheld by the Supreme Court.”), and Robin West, A 
Marriage is a Marriage is a Marriage: The Limits of Perry v. Brown, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 47, 
52–53 (2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol125for_west.pdf (“Perry v. 
Brown ultimately does not advance our understanding of the political, social, moral, or 
even constitutional meanings of marriage or sex, and in fact it confuses both.  But was 
the flame worth the candle?  All that truncated social thought was, after all, put to an 
unequivocally good end . . . . It would have been all the better, though, if the Court and 
the lawyers who forced its hand had left the People alone to reach that decision them-
selves.”), with Eskridge, supra note 14, at 96, 98 (“As a matter of constitutional law, Judge 
Reinhardt’s opinion was more rigorously reasoned than either the trial court’s opinion 
that he affirmed or the views of commentators who would have liked a more sweeping rul-
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view before the Ninth Circuit, and it is entirely possible that the en 
banc court—or eventually the Supreme Court—will be forced to 
squarely address the question of same-sex marriage rights in the 
course of this litigation.20
The second front consists of challenges to DOMA, which has 
been invalidated by district courts in Boston
   
21 and San Francisco,22
These Proposition 8 and DOMA cases render moot much of the 
debate over the wisdom of bringing a constitutional challenge to laws 
that deny marriage equality.  That game is already on.    
 
and which may soon face review before the First and Ninth Circuits.  
Given the current status of these cases, it is possible that the DOMA 
challenges may be the first same-sex marriage cases to reach the Su-
preme Court on a petition for certiorari.   
So perhaps the gradualist would instead insist that, if faced with a 
supposedly direct challenge to laws banning same-sex marriage, the 
Supreme Court should aggressively exercise its famed “passive virtues” 
to avoid hearing any such claim or to narrow the scope of the ques-
tion presented.23
 
ing. The fans of a broader ruling, of course, are more inspired by constitutional politics 
than by constitutional law—but they are wrong about the politics as well . . . Judge Rein-
hardt’s decision in Perry v. Brown advances the ball just a little, and not too much.”), and 
Marty Lederman, Understanding Perry v. Brown, BALKANIZATION (Feb. 8, 2012, 10:54 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/understanding-perry-v-brown.html (“I find this rea-
soning to be quite sound, and it explains why the panel was right not to opine on whether 
a state can constitutionally confer the status of marriage only on straight couples as an ini-
tial matter—a much closer question, and thus one better reserved for a case that requires 
its resolution.”). 
  Although we can imagine particular respects in 
which such gradualism or minimalism may be feasible, we do not be-
lieve that the Supreme Court should bend over backwards to dodge 
the issue, nor do we believe the Supreme Court will be able to deploy 
its passive virtues legitimately as an all-purpose shield to avoid the fast-
approaching question of same-sex marriage rights.     
 20. See Lyle Denniston, Prop 8: Further Review Opposed, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 1, 2012, 
05:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/prop-8-further-review-opposed/. 
 21. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts v. HHS, 698 F.Supp.2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010).  
 22. Golinski v. United States Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. C 10–00257 JSW, 2012 WL 
569685 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012). 
 23. See, e.g., William Eskridge, Marriage Equality State by State, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 15, 
2011, 1:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/marriage-equality-state-by-state/ 
(“[A]s Alexander Bickel argued, the ‘passive virtues’ are often the best.  The Supreme 
Court ought to avoid a final judgment on the constitutionality of marriage [laws’] discrim-
ination against lesbian and gay couples until the nation is substantially at rest on the issue. 
. . . [I]t is high time the federal courts debated the issue openly, and that federal court de-
bate ought not be foreshortened by the Supreme Court.”). 
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If the Proposition 8 case arrives at the Supreme Court on an ap-
peal from Judge Reinhardt’s opinion, or from an en banc opinion 
grounded on substantially similar reasoning, the passive virtues might 
admittedly come into play quite easily, since denial of certiorari might 
well be appropriate given the absence of a circuit split and the narrow 
cast of Judge Reinhardt’s minimalist reasoning.24
By the same token, if same-sex marriage first reaches the Su-
preme Court via challenges to DOMA, the Justices may have an op-
portunity to evaluate that palpably infirm federal statute under the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause before reviewing state laws 
that discriminate with respect to marital status against same-sex 
couples.  A decision invalidating DOMA’s blatantly discriminatory 
singling-out of same-sex couples from the normal deference federal 
law gives to state definitions of marriage might constitute a useful 
stepping stone toward a later decision broadly invalidating state laws 
that deny same-sex couples the right to marry—and, importantly, this 
stepping stone might fall either some significant distance or mere mi-
crometers away from the destination toward which the Court is step-
ping, all depending on how broadly the Court chooses to rule and 
under which theory it invalidates the disputed provisions of DOMA.
   
25
Acknowledging that in at least some cases it might be possible for 
the Court to duck the issue of marriage equality, or to broach it nar-
 
 
 24. See, e.g., David G. Savage et al., Gay Marriage: U.S. Supreme Court May Not Hear Prop. 8 
Appeal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/02/prop-8-
supreme-court-may-not-hear-california-gay-marriage-case.html (“[T]he 9th Circuit’s opi-
nion reads as though its intended audience was one — Justice Anthony Kennedy — and its 
message was that there was no need for the Supreme Court to decide the California 
case.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Prop. 8 Ruling: The Path Ahead, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-chemerinsky-proposition-8-ru-
ling-20120208,0,5128797.story (“Tuesday’s federal court ruling declaring Proposition 8 
unconstitutional can be easily explained: There is no legitimate government interest in 
prohibiting same-sex marriages. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court is likely to af-
firm the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and hold that the denial of marriage equality to 
gays and lesbians violates the U.S. Constitution.”). 
 25. For example, it is at least conceivable that a state government’s decision to with-
hold recognition from same-sex marriage in the first instance might be deemed justifiable 
by considerations of gradualism and tradition, while a federal decision, against a backdrop 
of nearly universal federal deference to each state’s own definition of marriage for internal 
purposes, selectively to reject a state’s definition of marriage when, and only when, the 
state extends marriage equality to same-sex couples, would be deemed indefensible as re-
flecting nothing but constitutionally illegitimate animus against same-sex relationships as 
such and thus would be doomed to invalidation under the equality dimension of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  No more than that would be needed to strike down 
the pertinent provision of DOMA.  Having gone that far, however, the Supreme Court 
might be hard-pressed to articulate a coherent rationale for a state decision to confer on 
same-sex couples all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of marriage while withhold-
ing from such couples the label and the social standing that accompanies that status. 
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rowly before eventually tackling the ultimate question of state laws 
that deny same-sex marriage rights, two critical points remain. 
First, the mere fact that the Court could non-embarrassedly dodge 
the issue does not mean that it should do so.  An obvious historical 
analogy—the Court’s disgraceful and widely condemned decision to 
duck the issue of interracial marriage when it first presented itself in 
Naim v. Naim,26 an error later rectified in the justly celebrated and 
perfectly named case of Loving v. Virginia27—is hardly the kind of 
precedent whose spirit any Justice would wish to follow.  And, to make 
matters worse, if the Justices were truly keen to dodge the issue even if 
it were squarely presented, the Court would have to perform legal 
acrobatics far more painful to behold than those employed in Naim, 
because Lawrence laid the groundwork for striking down bans on 
same-sex marriage in much starker terms than did Brown for invalida-
tion of anti-miscegenation laws—terms so stark that Justice Scalia, in 
his ferocious Lawrence dissent, as much as conceded that a rejection of 
the federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage could not be re-
conciled with the Lawrence holding or with its underlying rationale.28
Nor do other bases for evasion readily come to mind.  It is hard 
to imagine a persuasive basis grounded in standing or justiciability for 
the Court to pass the hot potato on any of the pending cases.  And 
this question would truly reach the Court as no bolt from the blue, 
readily dodged or dismissed as improvident to consider due to lack of 
sufficient percolation.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has already grap-
pled with and embraced the very principles that ought to decide this 
matter.  Finally, it bears mention that the court of history has not 
looked kindly on Justices, like those in Naim, who punted on the great 
civil rights issues of their era.    
   
Second, some of the justifications that purport to explain why the 
Court should stay its hand or only strike narrowly at discrimination 
have grown quite frail.  To put our point bluntly, the cultural ground 
has shifted so deeply as well as rapidly in recent years that the Court 
would simply lack credibility were it to claim that the equal protection 
of the laws—and the Constitution’s protection of fundamental liberty 
 
 26. See 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955) (upholding Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute), va-
cated (due to the inadequacy of the record), 350 U.S. 891 (1955), aff’d, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 
1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (mem.). 
 27. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute, and those 
of fifteen other states, “cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 28. 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Lawrence majority 
opinion “dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to 
be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in 
marriage is concerned”). 
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interests—could be satisfied by relegating same-sex couples either to a 
second-class form of civilly sanctified relationship or to a social space 
in which their love, commitment, and dignity are denied any legal 
recognition at all.  As a basis for judicial inaction, overblown fears of 
socio-political backlash grow harder to defend with every passing 
month.  Calls for the Court to cut this baby in half—or to ignore it or 
throw it out the window entirely—are thus out of step with evolving 
social mores and deeply offensive to anyone who resents the injustice 
of condemning gays and lesbians to an open-ended legal limbo.29
This is especially true for those of us who believe that same-sex 
relationships are as valuable as opposite-sex relationships wherever 
they happen to be found, and who see little virtue in forcing gays and 
lesbians from across the United States to accept only a few geographic 
enclaves that recognize their rights while waiting for the rest of the 
nation to see the light. 
   
However that may be, even if in some meta-legal sense it might 
be “better” for the process of recognizing same-sex marriage rights to 
proceed state by state, legislature by legislature, or referendum by re-
ferendum, that road now appears to be closed (or at least closing).  
This question, like so many others before it, has followed the path 
predicted by Tocqueville and spread from the realm of politics into 
the judicial domain.30
 
 29. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, Why Gay Marriage Is Inevitable, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/12/opinion/la-oe-klarman-gay-marriage-and-the- 
  Sooner or later—and it could well be sooner—
the Supreme Court will hear a case squarely presenting the question 
of same-sex marriage rights.  And when such a case appears before 
that Court, whether the case is styled Perry v. Brown or Gill v. Office of 
Personnel Management or something entirely different, the Justices 
courts-20120212 (“As recently as seven or eight years ago, there might not have been a sin-
gle justice prepared to declare a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage.  Opi-
nion polls then showed that Americans opposed gay marriage by a 2-1 margin, and a Mas-
sachusetts court decision declaring a right to gay marriage under the state constitution 
produced an enormous political backlash in 2004, with 13 states enacting constitutional 
bans . . . The situation has since changed dramatically.  Opinion polls now consistently 
show that a slender majority of Americans support gay marriage.  State supreme courts in 
California, Connecticut and Iowa have ruled in its favor, and legislatures in five states have 
enacted gay-marriage statutes. . . .  Why is gay marriage inevitable?  First, the basic insight 
of the gay rights movement over the last four decades has proved powerfully correct: As 
more gays and lesbians have come out of the closet, the social environment has become 
more gay friendly. . . .  A second reason that gay marriage seems inevitable is that young 
people so strongly support it . . . .  A 2011 poll found that 70% of those age 18 to 34 sup-
ported gay marriage.  It is hard to imagine a scenario in which young people’s support for 
gay marriage dissipates as they grow older.”). 
 30. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., HarperCol-
lins 1988) (1840) (“There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not 
sooner or later turn into a judicial one.”).   
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must do as constitutional principle requires and strike down laws that 
limit civil marriage to opposite-sex couples.31
The case for same-sex marriage follows directly from Lawrence’s 
potent recognition of the right to dignity and equal respect for all 
couples involved in intimate relationships, regardless of the sex of 
each individual’s chosen partner.
 
32  Sounding in the constitutional 
registers of due process and equal protection, Lawrence sought to se-
cure a fundamental and yet fragile dignity interest whose boundaries 
necessarily extend far beyond the bedroom door.33  Notwithstanding 
a few half-hearted qualifications34 that Justice Scalia quite rightly dis-
missed as inconsistent with its underlying reasoning and as trivial bar-
riers to same-sex marriage rights,35 Lawrence and the principles it 
represents are thus incompatible with state and federal laws that 
refuse two men or two women the full tangible and symbolic benefits 
of civil marriage.36
These benefits are undoubtedly substantial.  As Chief Justice 
Margaret Marshall explained on behalf of the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health: 
 
 
 31. There is, of course, a close connection between our argument that the Court 
should not hesitate to address this question when fairly presented with it and our argu-
ment that the Court should reach a particular result.  If a Justice on the Court knew with 
certainty that he or she were the “swing Justice” on the matter and were simply unper-
suaded by the case for same-sex marriage as it currently stands or unwilling to sign such an 
opinion until public opinion more firmly coalesced around marriage equality, he or she 
might reasonably decide to rule on the narrowest possible grounds in order to preserve 
room in the future for a pro-same-sex marriage rights opinion (or to at least keep the 
Court’s options open).  In that event, although use of the passive virtues can be troublingly 
rights-contracting where it forestalls a rights-expanding decision, the passive virtues may 
also be rights-expanding where they leave the issue open for further rights-favorable rul-
ings. 
 32. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (stating that relationships, whether gay or straight, in-
volve not just “the right to have sexual intercourse” but the creation of “a personal bond 
that is more enduring,” and that “[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution allows homo-
sexual persons the right to make this choice”). 
 33. The Lawrence Court accordingly observed that “[e]quality of treatment and the due 
process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of li-
berty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both 
interests.”  Id. at 575.  See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas, The “Fundamental 
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004). 
 34. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether 
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons 
seek to enter.”). 
 35. See supra note 28; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asking, in light 
of Lawrence’s holding and reasoning, “what justification could there possibly be for deny-
ing the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising [t]he liberty protected by 
the Constitution?” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
 36. See, e.g., The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).  
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Marriage [] bestows enormous private and social advantages 
on those who choose to marry. Civil marriage is at once a 
deeply personal commitment to another human being and a 
highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, compa-
nionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family. “It is an association 
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, 
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or so-
cial projects.” Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe 
haven, and connection that express our common humanity, 
civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision 
whether and whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts 
of self-definition.37
At least on this point, both sides of the debate typically agree.  Not-
withstanding occasional efforts to portray marriage as little more than 
a vehicle for procreation and family stability (a characterization that 
raises intriguing questions about why we allow marriage by prisoners, 
the elderly, the infertile, and those with no intention of procreation), 
most of us recognize that marriage has assumed profound expressive, 
personal, and financial significance in modern society.
 
38
Laws that limit these benefits to opposite-sex couples will, we sus-
pect, come in the not-too-distant future to be viewed as anachronisms 
that just barely survived the twentieth century and ultimately col-
lapsed under the weight of their striking inconsistency with evolving 
public consensus, advances in civil rights, and core constitutional 
principles.  Just as we now look back on Loving and celebrate its teach-
 
 
 37. 798 N.E.2d 941, 954–55 (Mass. 2003) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 486 (1965)).  In an appropriate memorial to Justice Marshall’s stirring words, this 
passage has become one of the most popular readings at same-sex marriage ceremonies.  
See Bernadette Coveney Smith, Top 5 Ceremony Readings for Gay Weddings, 14 STORIES (July 
9, 2011), http://www.14stories.com/_blog/Weddings_Redefined/post/Top_5_Ceremony 
_Readings_for_Gay_Weddings/. 
 38. We recognize, of course, that marriage is not necessarily the public and private 
form that all same-sex couples might prefer to adopt, and that marriage is not the only ve-
hicle through which same-sex couples can achieve fulfillment or recognition.  See, e.g., Ka-
therine Franke, Marriage is a Mixed Blessing, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html (“While many in our 
community have worked hard to secure the right of same-sex couples to marry, others of 
us have been working equally hard to develop alternatives to marriage. For us, domestic 
partnerships and civil unions aren’t a consolation prize made available to lesbian and gay 
couples because we are barred from legally marrying. Rather, they have offered us an op-
portunity to order our lives in ways that have given us greater freedom than can be found 
in the one-size-fits-all rules of marriage.”).  However, given the significance of marriage as 
an institution in American life and the fact that many same-sex couples quite obviously 
would prefer at least the option of participating in that institution, marriage equality re-
mains a critical part of any movement to allow same-sex couples the freedom to order their 
lives as equals in American society and as agents entitled to full respect for their autonomy.    
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ing that the fundamental right to marry transcends boundaries of 
race that once seemed obvious and essential, so too should the restric-
tion of marriage to opposite-sex couples be recognized as jarringly out 
of sync with the respect for dignity that Lawrence so memorably articu-
lated: “The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.  
The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”39  Whether conceptua-
lized as a fundamental right to marriage steeped in traditions of liber-
ty,40 as an embrace of equality that refuses to discriminate against op-
posite-sex couples on grounds of sex and sexuality,41 or as both,42
As many others have powerfully demonstrated, arguments to the 
contrary are ultimately unpersuasive.
 
same-sex marriage rights are firmly grounded in the Constitution.  
The time has come for the Court to recognize this truth. 
43
 
 39. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (majority opinion). 
  Some of those arguments boil 
down to an implausibly narrow and essentially question-begging read-
ing of the “right to marry” that engages with precedent at an inde-
 40. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 794 (2011) 
(“The liberty claim [for same-sex marriage] is more persuasive because it performs the 
empathy it seeks. It frames the right at a high enough level of generality that opposite-sex 
couples are urged to imagine a world in which they were denied the right.”).  
 41. See Deborah Hellman, Marriage Equality: A Question of Equality Rather than Liberty, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 26, 2011, 10:35 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/mar-
riage-equality-a-question-of-equality-rather-than-liberty/ (“[T]he Court should rule that 
Proposition 8 is indeed unconstitutional, if it reaches the merits, but it should choose 
equal protection over due process for reasons of principle rather than reasons of policy.”); 
cf. Heather Gerken, Larry and Lawrence, 42 TULSA L. REV. 843, 851 (2007) (“[W]hat is re-
ally at stake in these debates [over gay rights] is not whether all humans should enjoy a 
right, but whether gays and lesbians, in particular, should do so, and that idea is better cap-
tured by the equal protection paradigm. . . . Equal protection analysis begins with that is-
sue.”). 
 42. See Tribe, supra note 33; Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 
688 (2010) (“[M]arriage is a fundamental liberty right of individuals, and as such it also 
involves an equality dimension: groups of people cannot be fenced out of that fundamen-
tal right without some overwhelming reason.”); cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Law-
rence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2004) (“Lawrence is a case about liberty that has im-
portant implications for the jurisprudence of equality . . . [T]he Lawrence Court’s 
discussion of liberty would be incoherent without some underlying commitment to equali-
ty among groups.”); Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term — Foreword: Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 99 (2003) (noting “how 
closely Lawrence comes to explicitly melding the concerns of equal protection with those of 
due process”). 
 43. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? (2007); 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO 
CIVILIZED GOVERNMENT (1996); Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?: Same-Sex Marriage 
and Constitutional Law, 56 DISSENT MAG. 43 (Summer 2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Time 
for Marriage Equality Has Finally Arrived, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 19, 2011, 11:35 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-time-for-marriage-equality-has-finally-arrived/. 
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fensibly low level of generality and reads out of cases like Loving and 
Turner v. Safley44 their deep concern with respect for intimate relation-
ships.45  This miserly reading of precedent and the Constitution, 
which leaves the scope of protections against discrimination frozen in 
past prejudice, was decisively rejected by Justice Kennedy’s proclama-
tion for the Court in Lawrence that “[a]s the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.”46
Other arguments, shorn of their rhetorical focus on some inarti-
culable “harm” to the “institution of marriage” and their pseudo-
scientific claims about the supposedly essential characteristics of each 
sex, consist of little more than expressions of moral disapproval of 
homosexuality and moral devaluation of same-sex couples.  In addi-
tion to the obvious barriers that such arguments face—including the 
Court’s rejection in Romer v. Evans
 
47 of anti-gay animus as a justifica-
tion for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,48 and Judge 
Vaughn R. Walker’s devastatingly thorough rejection of the empirical 
evidence that purports to render these claims scientifically credi-
ble49
 
 44. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (striking down a Missouri regulation that prohibited prison in-
mates from marrying without the approval of the prison superintendent).  
—Lawrence also stands as an imposing hurdle. Justice Kennedy 
did indeed speak of demeaning those who are married, but his opi-
nion said nothing to suggest any supposed “harm” to marriage as such 
that some insist would follow from its extension to same-sex couples.  
Rather, he emphasized that “it would demean a married couple were 
 45. See id. at 95 (noting that “inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emo-
tional support and public commitment”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Un-
der our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides 
with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”). 
 46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
 47. See 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
 48. The Ninth Circuit followed Romer in holding that California’s Proposition 8 vi-
olated the Equal Protection Clause by depriving a minority group of an existing right 
without a legitimate reason.  Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696 & No. 11-16577, 2012 WL 
372713, at *17 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (stating that Romer “governs our analysis”).  The 
court concluded, “Proposition 8 operates with no apparent purpose but to impose on gays 
and lesbians, through the public law, a majority’s private disapproval of them and their 
relationships, by taking away from them the official designation of ‘marriage,’ with its so-
cietally recognized status.”  Id. at *28.  “The Constitution simply does not allow for ‘laws of 
this sort.’”  Id. at *1 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).  For evaluations of Judge Reinhardt’s 
reasoning in Perry, see sources cited supra at note 19. 
 49. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding the 
scientific opinions of an expert proferred by the proponents of Proposition 8 to be “unre-
liable and entitled to essentially no weight”), aff’d sub nom., Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696 & 
No. 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). 
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it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual inter-
course.”50
By thus invoking the essential role that intimacy and love play in 
marriage as an institution that is simultaneously private in its personal 
significance and public in the face it presents to the world, Justice 
Kennedy pointed beyond purely sexual intimacy to the dignitary con-
cerns that Lawrence safeguards and that are squarely implicated in the 
case for same-sex marriage.  Just as morally rooted hostility to homo-
sexuals and to same-sex intimacy flunked constitutional scrutiny in 
Lawrence even when dressed up in pseudo-scientific “studies” that 
purported to show the health risks or social harms wrought by same-
sex sexual relations,
   
51
Indeed, a subset of these sorts of arguments is, if anything, all the 
more puzzling and all the less rational as a justification for denial of 
marriage equality when the issue is whether to withhold the dignity of 
equal citizenship from same-sex couples whose sexual conduct might 
be wholly unaffected by their marital status.  This point, of course, is 
analogous to the common observation that denying marriage rights to 
same-sex couples who are already participating together in public life, 
raising children, mixing finances, and/or performing many other 
common features of “married life” makes very little sense if the true 
nature of the objection is to same-sex couples engaging in those activ-
ities (which will remain a fact of modern social life regardless of the 
decision whether to grant marriage equality).     
 so too should such hostility be disapproved by 
the Court as a permissible basis for ongoing discrimination in the 
domain of marriage rights.   
Occasionally, commentators try to circumvent these concerns by 
invoking either the Religion Clauses or the doctrine of government 
speech.52
Claims concerning religious freedom fail as a threshold matter 
because the government’s decisions regarding civil marriage do not in 
any way implicate religious practice or belief and impose no obliga-
tion on religious individuals or institutions to adopt for their own 
purposes the definition of marriage adopted for civil purposes by the 
  Neither effort is persuasive. 
 
 50. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 51. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Arizona Policy and Pro-Family Network in 
Support of Respondent, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102); Brief in Support of Respon-
dent on Behalf of Amici Curiae Texas Physicians Resource Council, Christian Medical and 
Dental Associations and Catholic Medical Association, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Concerned Women for America, In Support of the State of Texas, 
Respondent, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102). 
 52. See, e.g., Roger Severino, Or For Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Li-
berty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939 (2007). 
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state.  And the decision of any religious institution or individual to 
adopt its own definition of “marriage” for its own purposes reciprocal-
ly has no impact that comes within the cognizance of the Constitu-
tion, which operates as a limit only on government conduct and not 
on purely private action.  As the Iowa Supreme Court explained in 
Varnum v. Brien: 
In the final analysis, we give respect to the views of all [per-
sons] on the issue of same-sex marriage—religious or other-
wise—by giving respect to our constitutional principles.  
These principles require that the state recognize both oppo-
site-sex and same-sex civil marriage.  Religious doctrine and 
views contrary to this principle of law are unaffected, and 
people can continue to associate with the religion that best 
reflects their views.  A religious denomination can still de-
fine marriage as a union between a man and a woman, and a 
marriage ceremony performed by a minister, priest, rabbi, 
or other person ordained or designated as a leader of the 
person's religious faith does not lose its meaning as a sacra-
ment or other religious institution.
53
These considerations, taken together, render the Religion Clauses ir-
relevant as obstacles to legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
 
54
 
 53. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 905–06 (Iowa 2009). 
 
 54. There is little reason to worry that the Supreme Court’s recent recognition of the 
“ministerial exception” to anti-discrimination laws in Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), will disturb this argument.  Admittedly, some 
have noted that the Court’s effort to distinguish Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990), in Hosanna-Tabor encounters some difficulty.  E.g., Michael Dorf, Ministers and 
Peyote, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 12, 2012, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/ 
01/ministers-and-peyote.html.  The alleged inconsistency is that, whereas Smith held that 
the “right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 
valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes),” 494 U.S. at 879, Hosanna-
Tabor created an exception from the generally applicable anti-discrimination laws by rely-
ing upon a distinction between “government interference with an internal church deci-
sion that affects the faith and mission of the church itself” (at issue in Hosanna-Tabor) and 
“government regulation of only outward physical acts” (at issue in Smith).  132 S. Ct. at 707.  
Even if we were to believe that Hosanna-Tabor worked a major change in Religion Clause 
jurisprudence, there would be a compelling argument that decisions about which mar-
riages to sanction as a theological and ceremonial matter within the church would fall on 
the “internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself” side of 
this novel line, thereby exempting objecting churches from any obligation to recognize or 
perform such marriages (and freeing them from the threat of lost tax benefits or liability 
under anti-discrimination statutes).  But even before Hosanna-Tabor, and notwithstanding 
Smith, there was little reason to believe that religious bodies would be pressured, directly or 
indirectly, into performing same-sex marriages lest they be deemed to have violated vari-
ous laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or be placed in jeopardy 
of losing various tax or other financial governmental benefits. 
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Arguments grounded in government expression typically allege 
that a state’s decisions about whether to call same-sex unions “mar-
riages” constitute a form of government speech and thus do not im-
plicate individual rights because the government is free to “say” what-
ever it wishes about what the institution of “marriage” means to it.55
The first sort of argument—familiar from cases like Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum,
  
In the alternative, but in a similar vein, one might argue that such de-
cisions constitute a matter of purely internal government proce-
dures—akin to the government’s decisions about how to classify per-
sons within the census or for various bureaucratic purposes—that 
cannot be deemed to implicate anyone’s “rights.”  Even assuming ar-
guendo that expression is the proper frame of reference for constitu-
tional analysis of same-sex marriage claims, neither of these positions 
withstands scrutiny. 
56 which noted that “[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts 
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate gov-
ernment speech”57—effectively treats government’s power to “speak” 
as unbounded by the rest of the Constitution.  However, as the Court 
also recognized in Summum, “[t]he involvement of public officials in 
advocacy may be limited by law, regulation, or practice.”58  Specifical-
ly, government speech can be and surely is limited by other constitu-
tional provisions—including the Establishment and Equal Protection 
Clauses.59
Imagine what we would say if, after Loving v. Virginia, a state were 
grudgingly to permit African Americans and whites to marry—but 
were to stamp the marriage licenses of such couples with an insignia 
designating official disapproval of their unions, or were to place signs 
voicing such disapproval in government offices dispensing marriage 
  This explains why the insult to dignity and equality inhe-
rent in government expression of the message that same-sex couples 
are somehow undeserving of inclusion in the institution of civil mar-
riage would trigger limits of constitutional moment. 
 
 55. This point is analogous to the argument of a religious body that it is free to “say” 
whatever it wishes about what it will recognize as a true marriage, with the key difference 
that government’s “speech” in this context has important civic consequences within the 
control of the state whereas a religious body’s proclamations about its internal beliefs do 
not. 
 56. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 57. Id. at 467. 
 58. Id. at 468. 
 59. Id. at 482 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if the Free Speech Clause neither re-
stricts nor protects government speech, government speakers are bound by the Constitu-
tion’s other proscriptions, including those supplied by the Establishment and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses.”). 
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licenses.  Who would defend the government’s prerogative to engage 
in such demeaning labeling?  Presumably we would condemn such in-
stances of government “expression” through an analysis similar to that 
pioneered by Justice O’Connor in the context of Establishment 
Clause challenges to those official religious displays that a reasonable 
observer would construe as disparaging the equal citizenship of those 
outside the religion being favored or endorsed.60
So too here: Even if viewed as merely government speech, official 
policies excluding same-sex couples from the institution of civil mar-
riage, like official policies excluding interracial couples or couples of 
mixed faith or, for that matter, non-Christian couples, from that insti-
tution, would violate constitutional principles of equal dignity for all 
citizens regardless of race, religion, or sexual orientation. Govern-
ment speech is not unbounded—and its limits render it useless as a 
legal shield behind which states may discriminate against same-sex 
couples while evading the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad compass. 
   
A second argument borrows from cases like Bowen v. Roy61 to in-
sist that the terms used by the government to describe civil relation-
ships are a matter of purely internal governmental concern that do 
not implicate individual rights.  In Bowen, the government had condi-
tioned the provision of welfare benefits to a Native American named 
Little Bird of the Snow on its assignment of a Social Security number 
to her file over her parents’ objection—an objection grounded in 
their religious conviction that use of this number before Little Bird of 
the Snow came of age would be a sacrilege.62  Although a narrow ma-
jority of the Justices indicated in dictum that they would have ruled 
otherwise had the parents been forced to participate actively in the 
assignment of a number to their daughter,63
 
 60. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–90 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(pioneering a non-endorsement test in Establishment Clause cases requiring a court to 
examine whether the challenged practice conveys a message of government endorsement 
or disapproval of religion, and explaining that “[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonad-
herents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac-
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community”).  
 the Court rejected the 
parents’ free exercise challenge to the mere use of such a number in 
the Social Security Administration’s internal processes and concluded 
that, because the government had done nothing to inhibit the plain-
tiffs’ freedom to “believe, express and exercise” their religion, its use 
 61. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 62. Id. at 695–96. 
 63. Id. at 714 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id. at 720 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the result); id. at 727 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.). 
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of a Social Security number for internal purposes did not violate their 
rights.64
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to 
require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs 
in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular 
citizens . . . .  Roy may no more prevail on his religious ob-
jection to the Government’s use of a Social Security number 
for his daughter than he could on a sincere religious objec-
tion to the size or color of the Government’s filing cabinets.  
The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection 
from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not 
afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the 
Government’s internal procedures.
   As Chief Justice Burger explained: 
65
The analogy to marriage, however, is so weak as to be less than 
even superficial.  For one thing, couples cannot escape participating 
personally and actively in the labeling process; unlike parents who are 
mere passive bystanders in a government agency’s decision concern-
ing how to categorize their child for internal purposes, individuals 
seeking formal recognition as “married” are not bystanders but are 
obviously the key players in the unfolding drama.  Moreover, the de-
signation of marriage, unlike the numerical or other classifications 
used by government for its internal purposes, is a deeply public and 
private symbol that carries profound consequences touching on indi-
vidual self-understanding and social mores.  Decisions concerning its 
availability necessarily implicate important and intimate concerns—
matters of love, dignity, and companionship—that extend so far 
beyond government filing cabinets that they might as well serve as a 
canonical account of what does not constitute an “internal procedure” 
under Bowen.
 
66
Laws that discriminate against same-sex couples by relegating 
them to civil unions or some other lesser status are under political 
and legal assault throughout the nation.  Numerous state courts, and 
thus far several federal courts, have rightly struck them down as viola-
  Where external, expressive impacts so predominate 
over comparatively trivial internal considerations, any claim of bu-
reaucratic manageability can be dismissed as so tangential to the 
rights at issue that it serves as little more than an analytical red her-
ring properly accorded no weight in constitutional reasoning. 
 
 64. Id. at 700 (majority opinion). 
 65. Id. at 699–700. 
 66. Id. at 700. 
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tions of due process and equal protection.67
When that fateful day arrives, adherence to constitutional prin-
ciple and respect for the fundamental dignity of all persons dictate a 
clear result.  As Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote in Loving, “The free-
dom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal 
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”
  Legal challenges will un-
doubtedly proceed apace until the Supreme Court finally speaks. 
68
Whenever that momentous question finally arrives at the Su-
preme Court, the Justices should declare this right for the entire Na-
tion.  The reason is simple: if our Constitution’s promises of liberty, 
equality, and dignity are to be realized for the millions of Americans 
whose most intimate lives are degraded by laws that set their love, 
their enduring commitments to one another, and their very sense of 
personhood apart as little more than second-class, then in the end the 
Justices must do their duty and recognize same-sex marriage rights.  
Such is their responsibility as faithful expositors of the Constitution. 
  
Those words ring at least as true today as they rang in 1967.  Contin-
ued denial of marriage equality is simply incompatible with the applica-
tion of the Constitution’s core principles as we now understand them.  
The path of lesbian, gay and bisexual civil rights has been a difficult 
one, with tragic setbacks along the way and a course to constitutional 
understanding forged by extraordinary personal, political, and cul-
tural struggle.  Many difficult questions still lie ahead.  But marriage 
equality is not one of them.  Whether it comes about through popular 
referenda, legislative action, state constitutional law, or federal judi-
cial opinions—all mechanisms through which the Constitution’s 
deepest meaning can be written into American law—same-sex mar-
riage is coming.   
There is no other way.    
 
 
 67. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Perry 
v. Brown, No. 10-16696 & No. 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012); Kerrigan 
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 
(Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. 
Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  
 68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
